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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE 
GRAXT 1IACF ARLA:'\ I•; 
No. 9051 
BRIEF OF "Pl•:'ffTlONI!JR 
IN'I'RODrCTORY STATEMENT 
Disciplinary proceedings were instituted by the 
Utah State Bar agaim;t petitioner Grant Macfarlane, by 
issuance of a citation and complaint June 26, 1957 (R. 
1, 3), following an ex parte investigation of the record 
compiled in the civil will conte~t case eut.itl0d "In re 
Su;an's Estate" (Utah, 1950) 293 P.2d G82. 
The Bar charged petitioner with unprofessional con-
duct in the preparation of a will and codicils for his 
client, Wilda Gail Swan. All allegations of unprofes-
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2 
sional conduct were denied by the petitioner's answGr 
(R. 5). 
'rhe Trial Committee of the llar, composed of three 
Ogden la\\-")'ers, called a pretrial hearing August 2D, 
195i, in an effort to narrow the issues and to avoid a 
retrial of the will contest case. Jt was recognized that 
this Court, in the Swan case, ruled that a presumption 
of fraud and undue influence arose from the fact that 
the petitioner was a beneficiary under a will prepared 
hv him for his client. 
The Prosecuting Committee stated at pretrial, and 
reaffirmed later upon oral argument, that it did not 
have any "evidence of fraud beyond the presumption" 
and that "these fach, 11·ithout the preo:wnption, won't 
><ustain a finding of fraud or undue influence. We'>e 
got to haw the presumption rnade." (R. :l61; pretrial 
hearing, page 28). 
It was thereupon agreed that the Prosecuting Com-
mittee would rt•\'iC'II- the three 1·olumes of the record 
in tl1P IYill contest ('fl~e and would ,;c•lrd therefrom such 
portions of that record a,; were deemed relevant and 
material to the issues in this proceeding. Petitioner \\a~ 
given an equal opportunit~· and both sides had the right 
to produce additional witnr~n~.s at the time of the hear-
in~< wl1i(·h \\·a~ ultimately rondueted January· 9, 1958. 
At the hrariJlg', which consumed less than one day, 
thr Prosecuting Committee presented its case, consisting 
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nl' coudensalions of some of the testimony from j lu· 
will contest c~~e and, in some instances, vertinent testi-
mony in the form of question~ and answc1·s, a~kcrl and 
an~~~·ercd upon the civil ca~Q. 'l'lw only testimony given 
in per~on was that lJl'esented !J.' tlw petitioner who 
te~tilied cont'erning hi~ pL·r~onnl and profec<~ional hi::;-
t.ory and who then offered himself for cross-examination, 
altlwugh neither the 'J'rial Connnittcc nor the "ProsP-
ruting CommittPt> chose to r·xaminP ltim. 
The court rcpodcr in attendance wa::; tlit•rc·ttpon 
a~ked to compile the recoed by copying thf' extracts 
from the qnP~Iion and ans,c;,-er te~tinwny and 11.1· im;ert-
ing the tondcn::;ations of testimony into a nC\\' and 
complete record for thi::; }1carir1g. In doinp: so, the re-
porter reeorded the variou:;; ohjedions which had h0en 
raised by petitiont>r to ~orne of the evidence offered by 
the Pro~prnt in)!: Committee, ·which ol1jections had been 
taken undE'r advisement by the Trial Committee pending 
tlw completion of the entire rerord. 
The matter was called for l'urther !rearing April 
30, 1958, at \l·l1ich time the 'l'tial {;ommittee heard oral 
argwnen( as i~ revealed hy the reeorU beginning at 
page 352. 
The decillion of the Trial Committee was rendered 
September 25, 195K, and its recommocndation for di~ri­
plinary action was adopted by a majority of the Doar·d 
of Commis~ioncr:; of the l~t.ah Slate Bar !\larch 25, 1959. 
'fhe Connni::;sioners reeonnnended to tbis Court the 
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e~try of an order suspending petitioner from the prac-
tice of law for a period of one year and until he b€ 
recommended for reinstatement by the Board of Com-
missioners and, in addition, that he be required to pay 
the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. 
Petitioner filed l1i~ petition for review of the recom-
mendation April 29, 1959, and now submits his brief in 
support thereof. 
The foregoing explanation is offered to assist the 
Court in Hs examination and review of the somewhat 
unusual reoord upon which this prosecution must rest. 
Wilda Gail Swan died, without issue and unmarried, 
m 1952, at the age of 62. From 1944 until her d~:mth, 
petitioner was her lawyer and her friend. He repre-
,;ented her in nmnProns business transactions relating 
to her variou~ Jlrop0l'tiP~ in Salt Lake City. (R. 116). 
In 1947, at l11n TT•!l]('~t. petitioner drafted her Last 
\\'ill and Testament, in \1·hiel1 he was named a~ one of 
tlw benefidar:ie~. In 1950, at l1er request, he drafted a 
codicil and. in 1951, a secOIJd <'ndi('i\. The will, as modi-
fied hy tht' second codicil, n:wairwrl unchangE>d until 
l1N dPatl1. (R. :i,"ti). 
When the fi1·st codicil wn>< t'V'('Uted in 1950, it pro-
vided no additional lwqnf'~t to i\fr. :\Jadnrlane, except 
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upon the eontingenry of ti1e death of Mi~s Swan's father, 
\,·ho wa~ it~ principal benefieiar\· and re~idual legateE'. 
~!r. Swan\ death in 1950 resulted in a sub~tantial in-
aea~e in the petitioner's sharE' of the te:>tanlPntary 
estatr. This Rhare, however, wa.~ substantiallY rednec,J 
by the second codicil, executed in April, 19GL 
.\fter her father's death, Gail'R sole heir was hPr 
si~ter·, 'l'heo Hendee, of San .Franc.isco, with whom Gail 
maintained a somewhat ho~tile, tempestuous and unpre-
dictaUle relationship. (R. ~-!-.), :n:!, :\19). ThP.o had 
received downtown bu~ines~ properties l"r·om hcl" grand-
father and her mother (R. 242) and Gail rP.peatedly 
told her ta..~ advisor and friend that 'fheo was amp!; 
provided for and she did 110t intend to "leave her vrry 
rnueh" {R. 312). 
She had compll'tl"iY differP.nt in{P.ntions ahout J!r. 
\facfarlane (R-. 312). He had iml"fered a detaehed retina 
of the !ef"t eye in 1946. Later he lost the center vision 
in 'that1 ,eye 1md in 1D50, the retina of the rip;hl eye 
became detached. These afflictions required ~urger')' and 
hospitalization and, of course, prevcnkd petitioner from 
practicing law (R. 90, 111). Petitioner's troublPs greatly 
di~iurbed Gail (R H18) and she stated on o:everal occa-
sions that he might beeorne blind and she wanted to help 
him. (R. :\12, ()2). 
The will and the eodic·ils were prepared by peti-
tioner in his office, in the usual manner, following 
consulations with }.li:;s Swan (R. 91 d. seq.) Her teRta-
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JJIPntary intent was vt>ril'ied only by a medical and 
['Sychiatric examination conducted prior to her execn-
tio;, of the second codicil, which modified the will by 
;;uhstantially decreasing the earlier bcque;;t to the pe-
titioner. ( !t. 386). 
Petitioner did not sngge~t independent legal adviee 
be obtained before each testamentary instrument wa<; 
signed. \Yhetber .\1 i:;~ Swan had, or would have l1eeded, 
;;uch advice at any time between the dates of the original 
11·i II and the second codicil will probably never be knovm. 
\\'hen J.ii~o; Swan gave petitioner llcr ins1rnctions 
about the change;; to he made in the will by the ,o.econd 
rodicil, .~he asked to be examined h:· an "independent 
doctor" in order "to be sure ... that the will cannot Ue 
contr.·~1Pd" (R. 109). Her grandfat),e,··~ will wa~ con-
tested. 1-n re Swa11'.~ l'sta.te (1918), 31 L'. !10, lj() 
r . .J-3~. Petitioner, thcn'fore, made an appointme11t. for 
her \\·itl1 Dr.)._ . .\!. Xiel~en. and after sowe f'xarnillation, 
Dr. Nit>l~en. upon hi~ own initiatin'. asked a p~ycl1iutri~t. 
Dr. Ho,· A. Darke. for eon~ultatiYf' n~--i~truwr IR ::!1-t). 
A Hrr about an hour'~ examination, during wl1ich the 
o:J.ortors quPstionerl ::\1 i;;~ ::-;mm a he lilt tl1e propo;;crl dis-
JIO;;ition of her propert:, it ,,-n~ concluded that ·-~llP was 
lm'n11dl" ;;ound and certainly- iu tl1e adult brarket" I R. 
:..!!f1). :Dr. !l:1rke eondnded tlmt ::\li~;; Swan "knrw what 
;;lu· 11 anh•d tP do" with her pl'i'pt'rty and that "~]IC' did 
11-i,.:h to do what ~he \Ya<=' ~a:-inp: ~!J,. wanted to do with 
ln•r pnl)wrt_, ... ( n. :2:-;{ij. The two doctor~ accordingly 
;;igJI(•d as \\·it11P;;~p;; to the codie.il. 
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7 
l<'ourteen month~ lalf'r, r.Ji~~ 8wan died without hav-
in" made anv additional changes in her tf'l'ltamentar,\· 
0 • 
disposition. The will wa~ admitted to probate and, sev-
eral month~ later, Theo Hendee insiitntt>d the ·will con-
te8t ~uit which eulminated in tiJC deci;;ion of this Court 
in t!Jt' S1Nuo case. In ib deci::;ion, this Court llCid that 
the evidence ;;howed tlmt J!i~s Swan had tcslamentar:-· 
capacity. In this respect, the deci::;ion reversed the jud~­
ment of the trial court. 
Bceau~e or the relationship of laywer-dient ,,-hi<'Jl 
had l'xi~ted bel ween .\tr. },-Jadarlane and J.Jio;r; Swan, 
the Court held that his inelmion as a beneficiary in her 
will raised a presumption of fraud and undue influenct> 
and that thP presnm1Jlion thm,;t upon h.iut the burden of 
persua;;ion-the burden or persuading the trier of the 
fact that he had no't fraudulently imposed upon and in-
fluenced hi~ client's mind. 
In the ·will contest case, the trial t'ourt was not con-
vineeU thai thi~ burden had b('(·n carried and the Su-
preme Court, therefore, affirmed the der.i~ion and de-
clared the bequest to the petitioner to he null and void. 
1'he Trial Committee conr.luded that the presump-
tion adopted h~· the Supreme Court in i he 8wt~n ea;;;e 
''applie~ anU i.~ effediYe against tlw accused in this 
diseiplinary proceeding." (R. 379). 
\Vhen the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar adopted this conclusion and recommended that pet.i-
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tioner be disciplined by suspension from practice of the 
law for a period of one year, this petition for review 
followed. 
STATf<JIIIEXT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD AND UNDUE IN-
FLUENCE, UTILIZED IN THE CIVIL WILL CONTEST 
LITIGATION, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A DISCI-
PLINARY PROCEEDING. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF SUCH PRESUMPTION COULD PROPERLY 
BE APPLIED IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING, THE 
RECORD IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CON-
CLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD 
OF BAR COMMISSIONERS SINCE THE RECORD REVEALS 
THE PRESUMPTION 'WAS CLEARLY REBUTTED. 
POINT III 
THE MERE ACT OF A LAWYER IK DRAFTING A 
WILL BY WHICH HE MAY RE·CEIVE BENEFITS IS NOT 
UNPROFESSIONAL AND IS NOT PROSCRIBED NOR PRO-
HIBITED BY ANY CANON OF ETHICS, WRITTEN OR 
UNWRITTEN, NOR BY ANY STATUTE, RULE OR DE-
CISION OF THIS COCltT. RULE OF THE UTAH STATE 
BAR OR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AND SUCH 
ACT, STANDING ALONE, CANJ\OT SUPPORT A CHARGE 
OF UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
POINT n· 
EYL:N IF "THE ACTION OF THE BOARD OF COM-
.'Il!SSIONERS WERE OTHERWISE SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD, THE DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED IS HARSH, 
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DISPROPORTIOKATE AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY 
J)l vJF::W OF THE CENSURE ALREADY VISITED UPON 
THE PETITIO;-mR DURING THE FIVE YEARS SlN·CE 
THE CIVIL WILL CONTEST CASE WAS TRIED AMID 
WIDE PUBLICITY. 
POINT I 
THB PRESU~1PTION OF FRAUD AND UNDUE IN-
FLUEXCE, UTILIZED IN THE ·CIVIL WILL CONTEST 
LTTIGATION, SHOULD NOT BF. APPLIED IN A DISCI-
PLINARY PROCEEDING. 
l'hi~ Court, in the ,','u;.a.n coa~e, c;pceifirally di:>avowPd 
any implication that its derision should enlarge the pre-
sumption to the stature or '"'eight of evidence. [ nstead, 
it held that ''a pre~umption is the as:;umption of a fad. 
required hy n rnlP of law from tlte establistHnent of an-
other faet or group of ract.s. ft is not the fact<~ on whieh 
it i~ hascd nor the inference to be dra1n1 therefrom, hut 
a rule nf law fixing the legal consequences theecof ... 
This does not mean that the fact finder may consider or 
weigh thP presumption RS r•Yirlf.ncr." In r"P 81ran's Esloh• • 
.283 P. :!d at. pag·e G90. 
'l'his careful distinction by the Court cannot hP ig-
nored. Particularly is this tme where t.he Court fnrtlwr 
elaborated h.v C'llllJiwsi;-;ing that n1·it!lf'l" the as~umed fact 
nor the rule of law lm.'l "an.v tcndcne~- in rea.t:0/1 to prove 
thP existence of the presumed fact and, therefore, cannot 
be weighed as evidence thereof .... " (Emphaflis added). 
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10 
From the foregoing, it is abundantly elf'ar that the 
presumption utilized in the Swan ca;;e <'annot be substi-
tuted for evidence and cannot be considered as evidence. 
Its sole function in that <:ase was to shift the burden of 
persuasion for the IJurpose-~ of that ca:;c. That case is 
finally and completely adjudicated and public policy, 
,·:hich apparently dictated the use of the rule of law 
giving rise to the presumption, has been satisfied. 
Thi~ is a new and substantially different proceeding. 
Except for the petitioner, the parties are completely 
different. Even the petitioner ls here in a different role. 
In the fonner cttse, he was a legatee who8c bcqnast was 
attacked hy another legatee and nullified by the dccihlon 
of the Court. 111 the present proceeding. he and his pro. 
fessional life, training and career are at slake, in a 
matter in which the parties arc the ·Court and the [tall 
State Bar. By conducting tl1ic; review, the Court i~ m. 
qui ring into 1 he conduct of one of it~ officers. This fact 
alone distinguislw~ this proceeding from all that may 
haw' gonP. hP.fore. 
A~ stated lly the Court in ··Jn re l:"rail~, et al.'" 
(l.tah, 19U) -±2 1'tal1 282. 130 P. 211, ''Who are the 
pnrt ies to the disbarment proceeding~ Tlw petitioners 
on the one c;"11l0: but who on the otherl Certainly not tlw 
info1·mant. nor Th(\Jnn~ Xelson. lf there were another 
pn.rty, ... it 11·n~ the eourt; for the proeeeding involved 
maltrrs 1rholly lwh1·ee11 the court and the petitioners." 
,Siner it. is evident that thi~ proceeding has nothing 
kg-all~· in I'(HilllWll with the will em1test case. and sine~ 
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it mu~t be re(·ognized, in a disciplinary proceeding, tllllt 
the power of a court l~, practically, without limit, i.t is 
~ignificant to note that at no time in the proceeding,~ 
again::;t lhe petitioner to date has either side been able 
to locat.P, or cite, any decision lJy any ('Dlll'l l1olding that 
a _pre~umption of fraud and undm~ influence i~ lo be 
utilized in a disciplinary proceeding. ::\L•ithPr has there 
been fonnd run· authority upholding the discipline ol' an 
attorney upon a claimed 1Jl'esumption, or 11pon a record 
d1evoid of evidence or l'act showing an e-v-il act, a corr11pt 
motiYe. or dishonest conrf'alment. 
It is submitted that the rea~on for this dearth of 
authority lie:> in the inhe-rently different Jlat.ure of a 
disciplinary proceeding. The court~ have long reco;;-
nized that the vro~.:eeding if' nnique. They have al~o 
recognized that in ~ueh a case there i,; a kind of "pre-
~umption of innocence" which inures to t}J(' benefit of 
the accused lawyer. Sr·e for example, '( A.L.R. 93, in 
which there will be found an annoiat ion entitled "Pre-
sumption of lnnocenee in Disbarment. PJ"Oceedinp:s."' lt 
is there ~tated that as a general rule the attorney has tlll' 
benefit of a pre~umption of innocence wl1en the true 
burden of proof is recognizer]. 
The Supreme Court of \Vashington has stated the 
proposition welL Jt held, in "In t·e Little" 24-± P. 2d .2:15, 
that the disciplinary proeccding " ... is a special proeced-
ing peculiar to itself ... " It then ·went on to :<U_v: 
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12 
"1'he respondent in o>uch a matter is, upon 
his admi~siou to the Bar, certified by the Court 
to have attained high rnotal and professional 
standards. It is to be presumed that he ha:; main-
tained them and has performed his dut.y as an 
officer or the Coutt iu accordance -..vith his oath. 
Every doubt ~hould be r·csolvcd in his fa-vor, and 
only upon a clear preponderance of the evidence 
that the acts charged have been done and were 
prompted by iwpropcr motives, should disciplin-
ary adion be taken. The privilege - mrd it is a 
privilege, not a right- to practice his profession 
cannot be lost to the practitioner upon slight 
evidence." 
~\ somewhat similar thought has been expressed by 
this Court in "In re Oliver'' 97 T~tah 1, 89 P. 2d 229. In 
that case, the Court ·was considering the effect of one of 
the ~ections of the "Revised Rules of the l)tah State Bar 
Governing Professional Conduct and Di~eipline." At'Wr 
rcfJognizing that, aE> to a member of the Bar who has 
allowed his d1JPS to lapse, the Bar may qn~stio11 his legal 
quali fieations to resume ~rtcrnbership, the Court pointed 
out that th~ lapse of ti:ne do~s not ~ffect hi;; ~tanding 
a~ a morally qualified, hut ,.;u;;p~nded, member of th~ Bar. 
The ·Court 1hf'n went on to say: 
"Xaturalh tllerP i~ the disadvantage to Uris 
that the Bar {nu;;t assume the burden of proving 
his lack or moral qualification: but this i~ in line 
wi.tl1 onr accepted tlH.'or~· of trials. It far better, 
after a nw.mber ha~ c.,;tnhlished his moral quali-
fications, a~ he does upon admission to the Bar, 
to premme that t]w;;e qualifications remain with 
him until ,;nrh ti.me a~ tiLe'~· arP taken away hy 
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pt·oper Ilrocethtre, thm1 to pt'bUHI(' ill of him !illd 
to requirP hiut to overcomP the last -prf'snmption." 
.\ careful revil'l\ o£ the deci;,ion~ of this Court in 
disciplinary JH''-ll'Cetling~ fail~ to reveal a single instance 
where a presmnption 1nt~ either ttrgNl 1n· utilized a~ a 
ba~is for di~ciplinary action. Instead, the clear imp~·rt 
ol' Hw· decir;ions i;.; that evidenre i~ reqnirec:l, it mu~t be 
,;ubstantial and eonYinring ill it~ 1wture, and nothing Jp~s 
than evidence will snrficc. 
Fot· l'XIllllplc, in "In 11 JlcCu!!IJuyh" Ui l'tall :'i:l:!, 
95 P.:2d 13, the Court was asked to draw infcrem:L'~ l'rom 
a SL·ries of fads which, as contended by the pro,;eention, 
>'liowcd that solicitation of busine~s by one Spencer wn,; 
at the direction of or with th2 lmowledge of the aeeused. 
After examining the record, the Court found that there 
were "rumors" and a SUS}Jieion of "ambulance "hasing:' 
The Court eoneluded, however, that there had hPPn no 
instance of f'olieitation f'hown "by clear and convincing 
evidence." In a further di~wnc;sion of the evidPncP, the 
f'ourt remarked, on this phaf'e of that eaf'.e, ··our attPn-
tion has lwen called to no instance in vd1ich an attorney 
was snf'.pended or disbarred on such meager evidence of 
solicitation through a runnPr." 
~·or eenturies, it ha;; been univPrsally rer,ogniY.ed 
that the court has had po\n'r to e>.rJ·cisc rigid {'Olllrol 
over the professional rondue't of mcmberf' of ihc legal 
profe;;;;ion. As pointed out b~· Judge Cardozo in People 
v. C11/kin, 24N K.Y. 4()5, lfl2 X.E. 4S7, in very early daYs 
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in ]!Jngland the court regulated the conduct of barristers 
"with minute particularity, even in matters so personal 
as the p:row'th of their beards or thE' cut of their dress." 
The courts of this country are not shown by the 
decisions to have wielded their power of control to this 
extent. It was recognized early that the power to dis-
bar" ... i~ not an arbitrary and despotic one ... but it 
is the duty of the court to exereise and regulate it by a 
sound and just judicial dir;cretion " /';x parte 8e-
combc, GO U. S. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565. 
As stated hy the Supreme Court of illinois, in the 
C'ase of !11 re Donaghy, 402 TIL 120,83 X.E. 2d 560, 
"'!'he disbarment of an altorney i~ the de-
struetion of his professional life, his character, 
and his livelihood. (citing cases) The court 
should, thererore, di~bar in moderation. Like, 
wise, the same consideration~ obtain in the appli-
r_ation of a suspension rule. A removal of an 
attorney from practire ... entail!\ the complete 
loss of a clientele with its consequent uphill road 
of patient waiting to again re-establish himself 
in the eyes of the public, in the good graces of 
the courts and his fellow lawyers." 
'!'hi~ ·Court. in harmony with the great weight of 
authority, has long recognized that a disciplinary action 
is of such seriom< nature and consequence to the accused 
that its power ~hould be 0v•rcised only upon the basis 
of "convincing proof." In re linuson (Utah, 1916) 158 
P. n'i . . ~s Uirth 167. 
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In that <:aC'e, after dl~eus.~ing other element~ m a 
disciplinary proeeeUing (in whieh disem;sion there is no 
mention of a "presumption") Hte Court said: 
'"The foregoing statement::; really contain the 
\Vhole gist of the law, '1hich is sustained by both 
reason and common :<ense. To dishtu an attornPy 
i~ a very seriou::; ;nn(tc-r indeed. lt not only may 
dl'l'rive him of gaining a livelihood for himself 
and a dependent fanlil.l', but it may, and usually 
does, result in prcvcn t ing him from making avail-
able all anteeedcnt prrparation, altl1ough that 
may eover pradically the period of a lifetime. 
In no other ealling are such far-reaehing conse-
(JUCnecs vi~ited upon a delinquent who lm::; not 
been found guilty of ~orne felonious ad. TllC 
rule, therefore, that the evidenee <~hould be deal" 
am] eonvindng is haspd npon a most solid foun-
dation." 
::io suc~t "solid foundation"' suppo.:-t~ the abortive 
use of tltP presumption of fraud in the pre<~ent inquiry. 
Tt has no ba~is in social or legal hi<~tory. ft cannot he 
supported upon the basis of reason or log-ic because, a<~ 
~tated by the Court in lhe b'~tan ease, neithet· t.he fad::< 
nor the rule of law involved in the presumption "have 
any tendency in reason to prove the exi~tenee of the 
presumed fad and, therefore, eannot be weig-hed as 
evidence thereof ... " 
Jn aeeord with this prineiple is the decision of tlw 
KewYork court in "In re Spencer," :!01 X.Y. Supp. 31;), 
206 App. Div. 806. Spencer was aeeused, in a total of 
nine charges, of viola'ting the code of ethics. In one count 
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he was charge-d with having procured by misconduct, 
fraud and dishonesty, two real estate mortgages from 
his client and thereafter, procuring the assignment there-
of to his wife, at a time when l1is client was incompetent 
to transact businc~s. The assignments were drawn hy 
him in his clieJll.'s bedroom, when he and ;;he were ~:~lone. 
As to I his count, the court said: 
"There may be, and probably io>, a presump-
tion against the validity o[ this transaction, and 
il' it were brought in qne~lion !Jy pcrsono: inter-
ested in ... the estate, and who were prejudiced 
by it, VN_\ likely the burden would be cast upon 
respondent to show that the transaction was free 
from fraud and nndt1e influence on hi~ part It 
doc8 not appear that. the transaction has been 
questioned lJ;>' those per~om. If re:;pondent's 
testimony in thi~ proeeedi11g is accepted, the 
transaction was honest and straightforward. 
'l'here was an opportunity and motive for re-
spondent to take advantage of }Ii~~ Sharp's 
enfeebled condition; whether he did or not, no 
one living knows. /J1 a proceeding of this char-
acter, I do not tlii11k if un1 be found a.s a fact 
tlwt he did. (l<;tilpha><i~ added) 
This is but another wa~ of .«tating that a presump-
tion of fraud, wltidt arhitrarih- ari~e.« from the nature 
of the confidential relationship, \\ill not be aecepted as 
a sulwtitntt• for proof, or n,; sa(i~fudory proof upon 
wl1id1 to predicate the discipline or an attornPy. 
To our krw11-ledge, no court lw,; eYN indulged m 
><nch a presumption or a~sumption durinR a disciplinary 
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proceeding involving circumstances such as are present 
here. Instead, the courts have recognized the punitive 
nature of the proceeding and have drawn inferences m 
favor or, and not against, the accused. 
For example, more than si...,dy years ago the Supreme 
Court ol' Cali l'omia in a disciplinar~y proceeding entitled 
''In re Ila.yrnomi" 50 P. R9!-J, ruled that " ... all intend-
tnents are in favor or the accused." '!'he :,mne rule, e:x-
prcs~ed in different language, is found in later Cali-
fornia cases. In Browne v. 8tu./c Bar of California 
(19fii'i) 287 P.2d 745, the court held" ... ~-iny reasonable 
doubts mu:;l. he rE'solYed in favor of the accused". 'ro 
the same efrecl i~ lhc earlier Calirornia CJJ.se of Ililde-
lHand v. State Har of Califo-rnia, 117 P.2d NiiO. 
In view of the nature of thi;; proceeding, and in tlJC 
light of the- legal principles and aut.horii ie~ already men-
tioned, petitioner earne~tly <:ontend8 that the Board of 
Commissionem of the Utal1 State Bar committed mani-
fest error in adopting the conclu~ion of il.ii Trial ·Com-
ntittee that "the prefmmption mentioned by the SuprPme 
Court" in the S1Frm case ''applieR and i~ effective againo:t 
the aeeused in thi~ di;.wiplinary proceedi~Jg." 'l'he Board 
then compounded the error l1y recommending diRcipline 
against the petitioner upon the ba~i~ of this mere pre-
sumption, which a.ro~c J'rom a rule or law, utilized in 
private civil litigation, at a time when, and under rir-
rmu~tanees in which, none of the conRiderations which 
are now before t.his Co11rt were present. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF SUCH PRESC:IlPTION COULD PROPERLY 
BE APPLIED IN A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING, THE 
RECORD IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SL"PPORT THE CON-
CLUSIO:-rS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD 
OF BAR COMMISSIO::->rERS SINCE THE RECORD REVEALS 
THE PRESUMPTION WAS CLEARLY REBUTTED. 
'!'he Prosecuting Committee ha~ repeatedly ron-
ceded that it must fail in this pro~ecution, if the pre-
sumption of fl·aud is not utilized, because it has no ex-
trinsic evidenee of fraud or undue innuence npon which 
to rely. 
A careful examination of the record reveals the 
neC'essii,v for this concession. Xo fad wa>I ever brought 
before the Trial CommittE'e, or the Board of Commis-
sioners, which tended to Rhow an) act of fraud or influ-
ence upon the part of the petitioner. 
N"ot for a moment do we r,oncedc that tl;e presulllp-
lion of fraud and undue influence, utilized in the S1nw 
,•as,·, shoukl be applied here. We confe~s our inability 
to understand how it i~ even possible or application in a 
disciplinary proceeding where the cvidcnC'c presented 
against an attomcy Jllust be "clear and ('OuYiTwinp:" and 
his guilt must be "clearl:• l'~tahlislwd." [u re .lhCul-
lo·ugh, 97 t Ttal1 :i:n 95 P.2d 13. 
To appl_1· the presumption here is to relieve the 
prosecution or this recognized burden of proof and, in-
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stead, to plaee it upon the accused, under circumstances 
where neither he, nor the Bar, can h.11ow from judicial 
precedent. the extent of the proof required to overeome 
it. 
However, for the purposes of argument, we ~hall 
assmne that the prosecution i~ entitled to thu benf'fit of 
the presumption. It seems to concede, because i(. could 
not properly do otherwise, that it ha;; nothing else upon 
which to ba~c .iis claim. As t.hc S11preme Court said, i11 
the Swv..n case, Cxcept for the presumption·' ... the trial 
court's finding of fraud and undue in f'lucncc probably 
is not supported by the evidence." (pp. G87 and 688 of 
29:\ P.2d). The prosecution can properly find no eom-
fort in the Sll'an deeision, became nothing in that dPci-
sion (·ompP.ls any l'inding ol' fraud. lnstcad, the court 
held that the burJcn o[ persua~ion was upon the peti-
1 ioncr ju the will contest case, and that the Supreme 
Court could not say, as a matter of law, that he had 
sustained it. The Court held, on this point, in spmkin!=!: 
of Mr. :Macfarlane and a <lO-d<lfendant: 
" ... although they dearly made a prima 
facie ~bowing, the l'i111liug against them on that 
issnP must be approved because it indicates that 
the trial court. was 110t convinced 1haJ. the fact::; 
arf' in thf'ir lavor." 
This is nothing more than 1~ said by the f'ourt re-
peatedly in affirming jury verdicts. In such cases, the 
Court a£finns because the jury was not convinced in 
favor of the appellant but, this i01 not the same as saying 
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that tiK' weight of eviden<>c wa~ again~t such an appellant, 
hecau~e if he had had ihe hurrlen 01' [!I"UOf upon the i~~\le, 
lrc would fail, and the vcrdid "-ould lie against him, if 
the evidence were PI[Ualiy [,n!arh'l.'d. 
Expre~sed in lJer·~~_.Htage~, if the total weight of evi-
deneG in a civil suit is viewed as 100 per cent, he upon 
whom the !JunlGrr or pL'r~ua~iou fall~ rnu~t convince the 
trier of the l'ad~ lr_1- the greater weig·ht of that evidence 
or hy more than 50 pereent" of the r,videJl(·e. If, after 
the prooi' i~ in, the evidence is viewed as equally halanr·cd, 
the burrlen ol' per~nasion has noJ been rarriPd hy him 
and, u_p011 U[IJ'Pal, the deci&ion ·will be affirmed hy the 
Supr·ernc Court. 
Therel'ore, i11 the Stmn case, while the aecuHcd may 
have plac·ed 50 percPnt of the weight of evirlcneG upon 
the scale~. he did not com'"ince the lower· eourt that he 
had done mor·e. The decision doe~ not at tempi to evalu-
ate the evidence, since a v.ill contest <.'ase is an action 
at law. 
To draw any additional infL'rtlll'e<:' fr<>ut the 81r1111 
decision, to dai!rr that petitioner pr·odueerl lrss than 50 
per<.'ent of the cvidrnre and that the contr~lanl~ produced 
rnon•, 1~ to ~train llw derision lw:-·1md it~ meaning. 
Y1't thi~ is nre\'i~l'IY whnl the Board of Cnnrmission-' ,. . 
er.s has done in this proceeding. It has conduded, in 
paragraph 3 or the conclu~iom< nl' il;:. Trial Co,nmittee 
""lim I thP 1H'O'\l.~l'd u~ed frand and undue influence to1\·ard 
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.\liso: S'van and that r;aid actions were a bread1 of his 
fiducial relationship, and is (sic) unproFessional con-
duct as a member of the Bar of the State of' Utah." 
Thi~ conclusion cannot be supported by any exten-
sion of the Court's decision in the Sumn case, and ccrlain-
ly is not supported by the cvidcnee in thi;, record. 
The only evidence in tlw record, on the pro::;ccution's 
side of the ledger, is the evidPnce that petitioner wa:> the 
attorney for 11i~s Swan, that he drew a will in 1947, a 
codicil in 1950 and a second codicil in 1951 and that in 
each of these testamentary doeurnent:>, be was named as >t 
beneficiary of a valuable portion of Miss Swan's cst.ale. 
Additionally, there is evidence that the only disintere6ted 
and independent consultation experienced by the te,;ta-
trix resulted .hom a medical and psyehialric examina-
tion conducted immediately prior to the execution of the 
seeond codicil. 
Opvosed to this evidence, and opposed to the pre-
sumption the prosecution o;eeks io draw from it, is the 
unequivocal denial of the petitioner that he exereised or 
utilized any fraud or undue influence at any time in hifl 
dealings 11·i t h the testatrix, the te~timony of di ~i ntcrc~ted 
witnes~e.~ that the testatrix desired to make surh di,;po-
sition of her property and had. expr·essed a repPated 
r·oncern for the welfare of the }Ktitioner, and finally and 
perhaps most important, the pr·ofessional, ci-.,.ie and 
personal ~tanding and reputation of the petitioner· wlrich 
looms upon the record unas,;ailed, uncontradicted and 
unimpeached. 
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'l'he record reveals p<'titioner has practiced at the 
Bar of this Court for thirty-two years, following his 
education in the public ;;chools and the University of 
Ctah. He i;; now age sixty, the l'ather of five childrE'n and 
grandfather of six. 
Ife has tv1ice been Pleded ily lii6 district as a member 
of the House of Representatives in the LegislaturG and 
twice elected a member of the State SeT1atc. During hi~ 
service ir1 the latter ehamber, he \1as elerted Pre~ident 
of rhe State Senate in 1941 and again in 1943. 
1 [e ha~ RPITed a~ Prf'sident of the Exehange Club in 
Salt Lakf' Cit,v and haii n~reived the unique honor of 
selection as National President of that organi~ation. At 
the time of the hearing of thi;; matter hf' wa~ sNving a~ 
:\'ational Prf'sident of hir: college fraternal organization. 
In addition, he has been active in the local council of the 
Boy Sconb of America and in other community and civic 
affair~. 
Hi~ professional practice has been general in it~ 
nature and he has ahmy6 practiced alone. In addition 
to his professional interest~. in ~·ear,; past he en:-;ag"ed in 
busine~~ activitie~ in the ranching, mining and eon6h'lll'-
tion lm.~inl'~:<l'~ (li. :l+:;, f't ~f'q.). 
This di><l'\l~~ion of the f'vidence ~huw~ cunYincingly 
that the record preponderates in favor of the pditioner. 
A>< will now be clemcm,.;trnted, the inferences from the 
rvidew·r and from the unu~unl manner in which this 
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di~ciplinary proceeding ha~ been eonU.ueted, lend r·ur-
there effediv.- ~npport to the petitioner's cau~e. 
At tlw hearing on January 9, 1938, ·when the CVI-
denliary port ions of thi~ record, including the complete 
and verbatim testimony of the petitioner, were intro-
duced, coun:>el for petitioner, in hi;.; opening r;tatement 
(R 304) and later, at the eonelu~ion of t}l(~ delense, a~­
Slued the Trial Committee that petitioner ''would an-
~~~·rr any question::> ,you might have or an~·one might have 
eoncerning thi,; matter.'' (R. :147) 
None of the law}'ers of cilhC'r t.he 'l't·ial Committee 
or the Prosecuting Committee ac-cepted this opportunity 
to determine fot themselves ·whether petitioner, in ex-
]ilaining his con duet, pos~essed that degree of candor and 
honL·~ty which would enable them to view his testimony 
with confidence. 
'l'he failure of the Trial Committee to make im1uir.v 
at that time is, in fairness, understandable since it had 
not then had the opportunity to read the record and it 
could not I hrn know \>"hether imJuiry would be useful. 
So sueh explanation is available, however, to justify 
the Commil.tee's Rilence- on April :30, Hl58, when the 
hearing ·was reconvened for oral argument. Although 
petitioner again -,vas present and available, neither the 
Trial Committee no1· the l'ro~ecuting Committee both-
ered to ask a single que-stion. 
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'Ve view this silenr,e a~ Jlndicularly ~ig·nificant and 
as indicative of the fact that this Committee, in passing 
judgment in 19G8 on the prof'c::isional conduct oF the 
petitioner', wa,; content to rely upon what he said in 
tp,;timony given more than five year.~ earlier, in a lJitter-
ly contested trial involving different partie~, different 
eounsel, different i~~~w" ol' fad and law and vaHtly dif-
fPrPnt stakes. 
ln additiorr, at tlie hearing of April 30, 1958, it lrad 
hccorue apparent, and it still is, that there was a glariTig 
inconsi~tcrw:· in the pro~r1·ution's rasf', revealing a ~ub­
~tantial variaTrt·l_' hctwccn ihc charge and the proof. The 
Committee did not seek an explanation. The Prosecuting 
Committee did not volunteer one. The inferences which 
may be drawn from thio: inconsistency will hL' apparent 
from the following: 
The complaint <'hargcd the petltwncr with profe~, 
sional ulif'conduct in that, after he prepared the will i11 
1947, thereafter he "prepared various codicils to said 
wil!, in tach of which his interest as a benefi:cilary became 
increasinqltJ more mli"autapcnn.,· lu liim." (1•;mphasis 
added) 
This is patently untrue, as n•Yraled Ly the doru-
ments tlt('III~Plves (R. 3Sii). They show that hy the will 
of l\fay 2, 1947, petitioner would have received one piece 
of property. Under the terms of the first codir·il in Feb-
ruary, 19GII. hi~ positiou \l:lS unchanged unless and until 
a contingenr>y occurred. On the date of the codicil, in 
viE-w of the un(•rrtaintiP~ of health of thof'E' invoh-pd, no 
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one could have predicted whether the contingency would 
happen bcfor·e the death of the te~tatrix. 
1'he contingency did occur, however, and as matter~ 
thrn stood, petitioner's bequest had inereased hecauRe the 
contingency resulted in the addition of four other· prop-
erties, t.ogelhe-r with that already mentioned in the will 
it~elf. 
In April, 19Gl, the seeond codicil was executed and, 
by its terms, two of the five properties were devised to 
someone else thus decreasing, not inereasing, petitioner's 
stated ber1uest, all of which j,; contr·ary to the charge6 
a~~ertcd against him. 
If, as is contended, petitionel' had iutended to per-
petrate [raud upon his client in the te~tamentary di6-
position of her estme, 11l•y would he have taken measures 
to insure the validity of the second codicil ''hen, Ly o:o 
doing, he received Je~s than he ·would llllve rer-eived ir 
lte had done nothing·! 
Thifl incomistency in the theory of the prosecution 
lias never 1Jeen explained. The '{'rial Dommitiee and the 
pro;;ecution have ignored it, 1>·hi1·h only serves lo empha-
size that the inferences to be drawn ft·orn it support, and 
are eonsistent with, the i>mocem·1• of the pelii.ioner". \Yhcn 
thesP inferrnee~ are eouplrt.l with the nnconiradietet.l 
testimony of the petitioner, the unimpeached testimony 
of disinterested >vitnes,;es ("onrPrning the intent of the 
testatrix and with the outstanding personal, civic and 
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profe;:;~ional record of the pctitimJCr, the conclusion i.e; 
ine;;capable that the reconl does not support the eon-
du~ion~ and reeomutendation~ of the Board of Bar Com-
ITIIS~i0ll6l'S. 
POli"T III 
THE MERE ACT OF A LAWYER I:-:1 DRAFTING A 
WILL BY WHICH HE MAY RECEIVE BENEFITS IS NOT 
UNPROFESSIONAL AND IS :-:lOT PROSCRIBED :-JOR PRO-
HIBITED BY A)JY CA::.!ON OF ETHICS, WRITTEN OR 
UNWRITTEN, :t\OR BY A::-JY STATUTE, RULE OR DE-
CISION OF THIS COURT, RULE OF THE L"TAH STATE 
BAR OR THE AMERlCAN BAR ASSOCIATIO::-r, AKD St:CH 
A·CT, STANDING ALONE, CANNOT SUPPORT A CHARGB 
OF UNPROFESSIONAL CO~DUCT. 
After the ruling of the trial z·ourt in the 11 ill conh·~L 
rase and again after tl1i;; Court handed down it;: deci.~ion 
upon appeal, tltPI'f' arose in some legal l'irdf's aery for 
p~·titioner'~ professional scalp ber.ause, it was said, he 
lmd ''breached the etlti(·~" of the profe~:-;ion. 
Upon the hearing in this ruattPr, the Trial Commit-
tee was inlormed by counsel that the matters involved 
did not appear to he pro~cribed hy, and petitioner 1rn~ 
not charged ,,-jt!J a Yiolation of, ''any canon. any opinion 
ol' the committee construing canons. any violation of n 
rtah rule of bar procedure, a11_Y violation of a ~tatute, 
i11l'ormal order, opinion, ~lntPJll('llt or anything t>l~l\ t'X-
cept the opinion of a great many lfn1·y~·r,; who now, after 
the 81can •kt·ision has been rendered, c.t l'o"t ract(J 
realizP tl1~tt they lmew it wn,:; 'l·rm1g all along" \R. :-Hi:'.). 
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'l'lw Prosecuting Committee did not difqmte th.is eon-
tendon which was again as~erted in the informal hearing 
before the Board or Bar Commissioners. lt was tlwre 
contended, as it is now, that a charge oi' u11profe:;;sional 
t·unduct cannot be supporteU by proof that a la\\)'er 
drafted a 1vill hy whieh he might receive benef'its unless 
there are additional fadors proved as evidence ol' a 
rraudulent or corrupt intent. 
This is not to say that a lawyer act::; >vi~ely i I' ite 
dra\\ ~ such a wilL As stated by the Court of Appeals 
of \"ew York in the well-known case rnlit.led "Jlp P11f-
liam," 257 N.Y. 140, 177 :\.E. 399, 
"Attorneys for C'lients who intend to leave 
tlwm or their families a bequest would do well to 
have the will drawu by ~orne otlwr la"\\'Yer. Any 
;;u~pieion whieh may arise of improper influence 
used under the covet· o[ the confidential relation-
ship may UHis b0 avoided." 
But petitioner is here not charged with heing un-
wi~e. He is rhargcd \vith unprofe~sional condurt hera usc 
of thP.ll~C of" f'raud and nndnr inf111i'lll'6. 
"\Ve believe it significant that there have been many 
dc0isiona by lT\an,\· courts inYolving will~ preparr.d hy 
lawyer~ who al~o were beneficiaries tJ1ereof but in 110 
instan~e havr. we found a Jeci~ion, and none wa~ cited 
to n~ by the prosecution, where the court condemned 
the attornr._,'s actions as p1·of'cs:>ional r11i~conduct, in the 
absence of additional fact~ . ..-;1~1· for- example, "Re Pul-
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1wm," supra; Mntter of Ki1u!IH:rg',; Will, X.Y., 100 K.E. 
7~!!; .Marx v.llfcGlynn, S8 N.Y. 357. 
The comment of the Supreme CoUI1 of Idaho in 
1946 i~ pertinent here. In Su·ari11gen v. Swans/1om, 105 
P.2d 692, the Idaho Court observed: 
'·lf the relation of attorney and client or 
IJiincipal and agent e:-;isting between the parties 
i~ sufficient to constitute undue influence by the 
attorney or ag·cnt' over tlw }Jf'ineipal, it would 
throw open many \\ill~ Jo l'tlutr;;t; awl, on the 
contrary, an existence of such a relationship often 
furnishes potent rea~ons for the execution of a 
will in J'avor of sud1 an attorney or agent (Citing 
<>ascs . ) " 
Thm;e who have been trained under Anglo-.\meri-
l"an juri;;prudence and who have been honored hy ad-
misllion to the Bar of this StatE' have, ~inec our Parliest 
Pxposure to the Jaw, cherished the concept that the law 
permits no punishment without proof of violation of a 
rule which, ·while perhaps not kn011·n or ·widely under-
stood, is at least subject to a~eertainment. Snrh rule.~ are 
for tl1e guidanre of the bench and Bar. :'\o such rule C'an 
her<> be founrl. 
'!'his situation J» nn! unlike that which confronted 
the ~uprenlf' Court of Ca\il"ornia in 1950 when it decided 
Hilddmwd r. State flor of Cali_tiJruia. :.::.:;1 P. 2d 508. 
That wac; a proceeding to review a recommendation of 
1 he Board of Governors of the State Bar of California 
llwt petitioners should be disciplinerl heran;;p tll('_l· had 
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participated in a plan under wl1ich a labor union estab-
lished a legal aid department to assist injured members 
of the union in proeuring legal counsel. 
The decision of the Court -.,vas in favor of petitioners 
and was expressed in the following language; 
" ... in the absence of any prior deci~ion m 
this State holding that it was improper for peti-
tioner;; to participate in such a plan in the manner 
above described, it is our conduo;ion that the ends 
of justice ·will be served by di~missing the pres-
ent proceeding >vithout disciplinary action, there-
by pennitting this opinion, a:; the fir::.t expre;;sion 
of the views of this Court upon the subject, to 
serve prospectively as a guiilc to the HIC'lnbcrs of 
the profeo:sion generally, rather than to serve 
retrospectively to the dei riment of petitioner~." 
POINT IV 
F.VE:-:f IF THE ACTJOK OF' THE BOARD OF COM-
MISSIONERS WERE OTHERWISE S"CPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD, THE DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED IS HARSH, 
DISPROPORTIONATE AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY 
IX VIEW OF THE CE:-:TSURE ALREADY VISITED UPON 
THE PETITIONER DURTNG THE FIVE YEARS SINCE 
THE CIVIL WILL CONTEST CASE WAS TRIED AMID 
WIDE PUBLICITY. 
Should thi~ Court disregard our conteniiom; and 
determine the issues against the petilioner, it will then 
be confronted with the problem of what, if any, discipline 
should be imposed. 
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\Ye do not intend to presume or to encroach upon 
thf' power of the Court \Yhen ·we suggest that the recom-
mended discipline is har~h and improper. In frrirnc::;s, 
hO\I'('Yf'l", it o;hou\d l1e ~ta,ted that l)etitioner has a]rea~ly 
undE'rg-orw, rt~ a re;;ult of the publicity attendant upon 
the prior litip:alion and attendant upon this proceedin~·­
five year~ of !Hlhlic opprobrium, manifested b.1- the lo"." 
of the esteem ol' many of his fellow practitioner;> and 
fellmv citizen::;. As may be readily imagined, his praetic,_• 
ha~ sharpl: dwindled. 
Regardlc~,.; of what oceurs in this case, petitioner 
l1as a long and uphill road to travel in his efforts to r~­
e~tablish himself. 
COXCLLBION 
There is more lwre at stake than "\lr. ~Iael'arlanr·'~ 
personal and profes~ional career. There i~ a principle-
the priTl('iple that no la\vyer should ~Land convicted in 
his profe~~ion except upon proof whieh '·c·learl;.- c~tab­
lishes hi:-; guilt." If la\' y:or6 in thi~ State a1·e to be con-
viderl upon p1·e;;umptions - presumption~ which may 
var~· in efl'cd "·ith the case, or the court, or the decision 
in which thr.\· are applied, and if law~ rr.;: are to !w con-
\·idcll of violatiJI!-" an unwritten rule of condnct. without 
proof of improper lllotiw. cl.·~ig-n or ad- then tlu" prac-
til'\' of this profe1<:<ion may haYC become so unpredictahlf' 
and so uncertnin that onh· those 'l-ith rlairvoyant fore· 
sight and peret•ption will presume to undertake the man-
a.,·t•nJrnt of the I'Onfi(kntial nffair:< of tl1eir rlient,. 
' 
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Tt is respectfully submitted that the proceedings 
should be dismissed and the petitiom~r be exonPrateJ 
t·ornpletely of the chaJ'gt_$ and implications n~scr(.ed 
against him. 
JOHN H. S;\10"\V and 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENRF;K 
101 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake Cit~·, Utah 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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